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Abstract
What factors  influence community  participation in the  Lall,  Deichmann,  Lundberg, and Chaudhury use
delivery  of urban services?  In particular,  does security of  household  level survey  data for Bangalore,  India, to show
tenure  enhance  the probability of participation  as it  that tenure security  has a significant  impact on the
provides  individuals with incentives  to act collectively  in  willingness of residents to participate  even  when
pursuit of a common objective? And are collective  efforts  neighborhoods are  diverse  in terms of their cultural
less likely to succeed when  there  is a high  degree of  background and welfare  status. Their findings suggest
heterogeneity  in culture  or endowments  among  that participation is possible  in heterogeneous
community  members?  communities when it is a  means to a common objective
and  not a goal by  itself.
This paper-a product of Infrastructure  and Environment, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the
group to examine factors influencing urban development. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818
H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contactYasmin D'Souza; room MC2-622; telephone 202-473-1449; fix 202-
522-3230, email  address ydsouza@worldbank.org.  Policy Research Working Papers are also posted  on the Web at http:/
/econwTorldbank.org.  The  authors  may  be  contacted  at  slal!1@worldbank.org,  udeichrnann@worldbank.org,
mlundberg@worldbank.org,  or nchaudhury@worldbank.org.  June 2002.  (32 pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper  Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about
development issues. An  objective ofthe series is to get the findings out quickly, even ifthe presentations  are less than fully polished. The
papers carry the names of the authors  and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations,  and conclusions expressed in this
paper are entirely those of the autbors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
countries they represent.
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L Introduction
Rapid population growth in developing country cities creates an ever increasing demand
for basic public services.  City govermnents often do not have the capacity, know-how
and fiscal resources to provide adequate services to newcomers while addressing the
existing backlog in under-serviced areas.  Public provision is therefore not always
efficient and affordable,  and sometimes does not consider the needs of individual
communuties (iOsiom, IYY6).  rnivate service pro-vision is atn UoLpti  in soin  llui  WIlKVs.
FrV  x  xiratav aiitwli,  xupy  by fsrker  runtr or garbag  pid1!e1-  ,on  is  f  ,wnA  eyib
.L %SR  WV U'-  CUjJjJFlJ  LJ7  44l1l  L  -I  -S  r'W  t5*  **t  hi  f.A  F.  -J  IV  flW  L
pnrivate contractors in narts of some cities. However. the opportunities for cost recovery
are often limited, especially in poorer communities.  Consequently, private contractors
frequently have limited incentives to provide basic services.
In situations where  government is unable and markets are unwilling to provide
basic services,  community based efforts may be able to fill the gap. Isham and Kakhonen
(1999) find that collective action improves the performance of community based water
supply projects in Indonesia, particularly as households gather collectively  for operation
and maintenance activities suich as cleaning drains and tanks. Pargal et al. (1999) evaluate
determinants of community organization for garbage collection services in Dhaka,
Bangladesh and find that honieowners have stronger community ties than those who are
temporary residents. If seif-priovision of urban services by local communities and
neignboUrniodU  caU  UV  cUUniUdIVU  a  uel-ul ULnipLU11nL  LU  PUUIn  ubi aIU  pIVa4L  pruvisioU,  a
ma,or rpoliyu  uiPestioni  is  hnuo  ri-mynivinih  tl:v  n  cain  eh tnimriraged and f2GilitqtPA  bv
governments  and donors.  To  'answer  that question we need to know more about what
motivates individuals to engage in community initiatives.
iL1LIndividuals  may act. colectively  fnr many reaeons=  Tvnically;  some degree of
social cohesion is seen as a prerequisite.  This issue has received renewed attention largely
due to the work of Putnam (1995;  see also Woolcock 1998,  Knack 1999) who argues that
community social interaction through clubs or other organized activities encourages the
formation of 'social capital'. Social capital provides benefits to communities that are
similar to agglomeration  economies which provide benefits to firms. Proximity
encourages  face to face contacts and other types of interaction, which create knowledge
spillovers and help develop norms of trust and reciprocity between agents which in turn
reduce transaction costs (Collier i998, Fukuyama i995). ine main cirierence is maat
cOMImuu[LLY  pic  LlJJ4LlII  foI  social  LtU4iula%Atin  is  an  exAInple  VI  a  noVII.  ur^tL  be.-ef.t,  wle
naco1nm.Pmtihn1n  ennnnmie  es 2re. ey2mnpleq  nf maricet henefits
Bldiidla  rld PlatL.eU  (LYYJ)  UdisItWInuI  UVLWVVII  HLLAUUU  Ul  l  r,4  rU1t  engageV  Ili
collectiven  a-t.ionv  bheicas  thpey havA  csir.ilar  dndowmnity,  cimilar r,ltura  nr cimrilar
objectives. Homogeneity in endowments  and culture are important factors influencing
participation in primarily social communities such as church groups or recreational  clubs
(Alesina and La Ferrara 2000).  Economic benefits through networking at social functions
or on the golf course will be a useful side product. However,  the primary reason for
joining is the ability to interact socially and 'bond' with other members of the community
who tend to have similar incomes or share the same religious, ethnic, or linguistic
background.
It is not clear that these 'bonding' factors matter to the same extent when
individuals act collectively in pursuit of similar objectives. The example we are
concerned with in this paper is the self-provision of basic services such as access to water
or solid waste collection.  To achieve a specific task whose benefits are realized by each
COLMIMLL  CUj  mebrindi-vidually,  .-esidtIILs  areV  IkeIy  to  overcor.e  dUIIlc  i-
e.ndowmen.ts or cultuhre.  Here commulnity interaction is a means to anend, rather than an
end in itself.  The limited literature on this topic largely focuses on the impact of
inequality on collective action.  In a study of group formation in rural Tanzania, Larerrara (2000) mius  LLIL  miequality  Lends to reduce membership  in  groups that nave
economic objectives.  The rich are mor,e likely to drop out in co-4nu  0tes  kft.  h  r
ineauahtv and individuals tend to sort into homogeneous income grouns leading to a
decline in group functioning. Baland and Platteau (1997) develop a model to examine the
impact of inequality on efficiency in the management of common property resources.
While they find an ambiguous impact, they conclude that participation may decrease as
inequality increases due to free rider problems in using common resources.
In this paper we investigate what factors determine willingness to participate in
community based initiatives when there is a homogeneity of objectives but not
necessarily homogeneity in culture or endowments among community members.
Controlling for community diversity, we are most interested in examining the role of
security of tenure. There are several reasons why tenure status would contribute to
enhanced participation in community programs for service provision. Tenure security
proviUde  ui%%.A.Uv*  for  iniviUda  LV  IIIVsbL in  tUIhe  kA3LLIMILLY  UVbe4Ucas  LUCe  gUiUls  10111
imnmrnvem.nt  in  Qervices  can hp.  pnita1pi7ed in  the hom  vluep  .o%ffand  Sr  '2A0A).
Home owners will also expect to live in their residence  for a long time and will thus
anticipate an extended  future stream of benefits from any improved service. In rigid,
regulated housing markets (rent control, renters protection), some renters will expect to
see the same long term benefits and therefore have the same incentives as owners.  Home
owners also tend to have lived in the community for a longer time.  The longer the period
of residence, the greater will be the level of social interaction between people and thus
the community's social capital (Hoefferth and Iceland 1998). Using data for the US,
DiPasquaie and Giaeser (i999) lind that home owners tend to be more engaged in
coMmUniU  y  groups,  letifg  'UIVL,  LcorI,LIUUd  Ui1t home  nUmtuwi  tiiu  Lo  oc  betier  citizens.
This is a manor motivation  for tax inrcentives  arnd otfer programs th,at encouage  home
ownership in Western countries. The same is likely to hold in develoning counties.
Using household level data from Ecuador, Lanjouw and Levy (2001)  show that
households with a stronger claim to their property are significantly more likely to
3participate m acuviues to improve uie commumLy.  Conversuly,  B,  U1  99l1773)  shiuws
that a large miant poplation does ,not facpi1itatP r,nnnpratinn  in iirbnn conmmirniites.
we use a recently compieted  survey from Bangalore in soutuern Iniua to exainiime
'Ut  Ulpd.L of1  LeLare  scCu,.t  o  vJl ULhV wLIUJlrl.gl%OO  ho  uIseLLdsJP  topar&Liate  i
commurnity based service deliverv programs=  We are also interested in the auestion to
what extent the shared obiective of improving urban services can help overcome
differences in culture and social background  in heterogeneous  communities.  In other
words, to what extent does evidence in Western countries on the determinants of
participation in social clubs hold when the focus is on community participation to achieve
an economic objective in developing countries? A basic assumption motivating this
question is that community based service provision is a valuable complement to other
forms of service delivery.  We do not discuss whether this generally holds true or in which
circumstances community based service provision is more cost effective, provides beiter
quaU4jLy  IIILcaZLI  orLU ia  soc.Jaiz  Jlyp  ra"UI  t  J  &JVV.ILU.d  or  FIVILL  pJ.-o.sio.
These arp imnnrtnint muestiPni  nn  .whinh  evidenre sn far is  limited.
Tne remainder of uie paper is orgaiuzeu  as iuluows.  iII  seLcIon ii,  we uiscuss  Uie
aalyk  app.-oach  oani  A-cn.be the fao,ars  or.  toh  crn.munitr  vi%uicipina,tion in
servince deliverv. Section m describes the data and econometric  specifications.  We
discuss results in Section IV, and present conclusions and policy implications in Section
V.
II A Model of Community Participation
In this section we present a model of community participation in which the individual
participates in order to achieve a certain goal such as an economic benefit or an
improvement in living standards. Participation  is thus not driven by the desire to obtain
purely social benefits associated with belonging to a particular group. Also, the decision
to participate is not primarily motivated by a concern for one's neighbors, but to obtain
private, excludable benefits for oneself.  Say for example tiat the individuai lives in an
4area tfhat is  uHnudr-serveu  Dy municipal snrv-ices,  suuii as wkterL.  ri  Allay  LtLll udeiude tu
,oin  f,tj  hi  iieid,hbrw  to~  i-bt~i,  better  iv t er  iAjwdpi,Ai=nt1u  of the city's rm^>amn  supply.
The model's self-interested individual could easily be allowed to care for his neighbors,
but only to the extent that his neighbors'  circumstances affect his own property values.
Our model is based on two simple testable assumptions. First, the returns to
participation are higher for owners than for renters.  To the individual, there are two
benefits to participation:  it yields a flow of services, and the flow of services is
capitalized in the value of the property. Running water is preferable  to no running water,
and a house with running water is more valuable than a house without. Presumably,  the
value of housing stock accrues to the owner, and not the renter. Formally, the household
maximizes an additive, unitary inter temporal utility function of the flow of services and
the consumption of other goods:
Ut=u(s  (pd  xrc  (d)  (1)
~  he.  e  've3i  the  %.o  of  SWAT  ice  fA. OfVA%0  p&  L..C.  ya  .. AA.qISL,  a..t  s.rtWiS.'  .0e  i.&  AArT  o
utility from the consumntion of other goods; less the cost of narticination  The household
maximizes utility subject to an inter temporal budget constraint, which in any period is
defined as its previous wealth, plus any net changes to wealth,
W  =  WWI+rd)  +  N(y  t-x 1 -c(Dd)  +  h(pD  (2)
w.here-er  is th.e peiod.a  t interest rate,  'A.  =  x,  =  ct3  snet s,ntAr.g,  nc  ad  h(p3  are +th  rn*, -m
to community participation that are canitalized in the stock of housing.  This last benefit
accrues primarily to the individual who has exchange rights to the property.  If the rental
market clears, and there is no oDnortunity for a renter to profit from "key money" or other
sale of rental rights, the capital benefits to investment accrue solely to the owner.  In
distorted rental markets, such as Bangalore, some of  these residual claims may accrue to
' The use the male pronoun is justified in this case -evidence  reported below suggests that female-headed
households  are less willing to participate.the  retr  Tn ou.  empiric  n  s+c-n  Upl-n,  we  l-n,  sor..e  r-nterg  to  receive  capita! U1I  I ~IVILV4*III  UL.  VLL  '.IALIIjJJ  L L.Ui  0,V%,L%LJ.I  U~LA  J  V",  "AVY  UL.  Yr  C  AI  L wI1W%L  n  w  ~
benefits from  nommmunity investments=
We cLIn  sUiVv  U.hsV  UU.ILY  ILLUrLAIU  LU  UV'IVV,  Uiv  V1ULIIULILLI  IVVlev  UIop  . ILi
ivind  Aiial  %  nrtticpnatfea  if  the benefits frnrn  t,rtinnatinin (thln*)  andi  rn*)) nre  areptpr thain
the costs of participation (c(D*)). It is intuitively clear that the owner (or the renter with
quasi-ownership rights), who receives both benefits, is more likely to participate for a
given cost of participation.  The equilibrium level ofp* will be a function of the cost of
participation,  and a vector of prices/costs associated with the flow of services from
participation  and household consumption.
Lack of access can be due to two reasons: The household cannot afford to pay for
the service, or the service is simply not available in a community either because of
physical constraints (e.g., in the case of water supply, there may not be a connection to
the trunk network) or because certain population groups are given priority in service
access over others. Both of these points are related to the issue of community
heterogeneity in endowments and in sociai background or culture as wili now be
A.scuss-A ;..-  I.. %Ac..eA  "n  -n
Wealthier households tend to have better access to basic services.  Tne rich can
pay user cllarge  or side  'pa-ymientbs  LU  obtain  lri-i'Ve  LV Uli  JUU  OL VILV.  Ur  p  oUrI
houlspholds,  on th.e other hand, the cost of external service provision  n ul  represpntt a
much larger share of their total disposable income. For that reason, they will be more
inclined to explore less expensive alternatives such as self-help groups. They will also be
more likely to contribute labor rather than money if their opportunity cost of time is
lower than the potential charges.  We therefore expect lower income households to be
more inclined to participate in community efforts than wealthy residents. The poorest
communities, on the other hand, may face different constraints to community
participation.  Squatter settlements,  for example,  are often inhabited by migrant laborers
and recent immigrants. These communities may not have accumulated sufficient social
6capital to enable community action.2 Taken together we expect the following ptern: if
cost of  servinces  does not vnrvqtnn  residents with tifferent welfare status_, pnrticipation
will be lower for the poorest households,  then initially rises with increasing welfare, and
finally drop off for wealthier residents. At the community level, we might then expect
households in areas characterized by larger variations in welfare status to be less willing
to participate, if the success of community action depends on the participation of all or
most members. This barrier to participation may be overcome, however, if  the gains from
achieving service improvements from participation  will outweigh the cost associated with
the increased risk of failure in economically diverse neighborhoods.
Alternatively,  services may be provided preferentially to a social group such as
the members of an ethnic majority that has more political influence among local decision
makers.  In that case, those who are members of minorities will be less likely to receive
pu-ulic sev-i.  IAibInI, BiJ[jlr aUnU EaSLely  I YY  (  )  fInUU  UliHL WV p[oVisloir  Uo  pUblic  gUUUS
is inversely related to ethnic hetero  y, altoug,  th-ey  do not discuss the distribution
of services within heterogeneous  cities. This imnlies that ethnic minorities in diverse
neighborhoods will be more likely to engage in "goal-oriented" (as opposed to merely
social) participation than members of the majority.
This leads to the second testable assumption. As discussed above, participation in
social communities tends to increase with economic or cultural homogeneity.  To put the
argument crudely, individuals have an aversion to heterogeneity, if it implies that they
will be forced to associate with people who are not like themselves. One "cost" of
participation,  therefore, is the act of association itself. This cost is higher in more diverse
communities. If this is the case, we will see participation declining with heterogeneity.
However, if the goal of participation is to obtain a necessary service that is not publicly
provided to members of minority groups, then the cost of associating with non-alike
perbon  wile  mrore thn4stbysebnfisrcie  lllljiri-  O-iluiz peoiauon  wI I  uu  u  U1all VIi0r.L  Uy  Uliv  UV1IVILOIUb  1.I~VVU  ILIU  JUJLLUIIr 4  LAJIiIIIIU1Lil~Y
2In focus group interviews in Bangalore, residents of some of the poorest communities  said that they
would not engage in community activities because they do not trust their neighbors  (Deichmann,  Lall and
Suri 2002).
7iru.t;ative.  in +1.at  case  s  +.ht.-ogeity,  will  havt  e  no effect  ot.nn  par,+;c.nz-;n or maee
inr.rease  wiingness to narticinate to overcome some form of discrimination.
'.JLLL  MUIUUJ1  U1LVVIULU  V,5LU11ALV,5  Mr. JlllliVIULU4  b  UVIU1alUl  Lu  aU  jJI%AjJL~  LL  4  VVOUj
me  a  frntt.;on  ofa vun2rnP  ofinf;iu  Aiigl andi  rnrnmwn,tv r.harnertprctir.  Frnom the
discussion above, these community characteristics include measures of heterogeneitv  in
endowments and culture. These are generally presumed to decrease participation, but it is
likely that homogeneity in objectives - the desire to obtain the service - will outweigh
these effects. In addition, it is the members of the many heterogeneous  minorities who are
more likely to collectivize.  Given that we do not explicitly have information on all the
specific component of p*, we proxy the costs of participation and price variables with
individual, household and community characteristics.  We can express the structural
equation underlying the observed behavior as
Pi  = a'W,  + fi  +ei  (3)
uwhee  AP*  is the individiiiP1'  npt henefit fmn  m6nrinsit.ingo  W. is  a vector of owm
characteristics, H, is a vector of community or neighborhood characteristics  that influence
the individual's'decision,  and e,  is a normally-distributed  error term with mean zero and
variance a.
We do not observe the latent variable Pi*.  We see only the results of the
individual's evaluation of (3), which is manifest in the choice made by the individual to
participate or not to participate:
D.  =  I  iPD.  °  ()
A  dL~~J  11  ~~~1/  (JUJ
Pi =O ifP￿ <O  (3b)
'v'VI esULte(  aJ4-U)  as  4  pJr,IL  m  eUUI,  corI.%gLI1  for  U.LlsifidU
het.eroskedasticitv.  TTnlike previnous papers  (e.g., Alesina,  Baqir, and Easterly 1997,
Alesina and La Ferrara  1999) we do not assume that the errors are clustered within
8political boundaries, such as wards (administratively  defined units within Bangalore and
other Indian cities). Note that equation (3) does not specify.the community to which each
household belongs. Rather than specifying fixed communities based on the administrative
or statistical unit in which the individual lives, we determine community characteristics
directly based on responses from each household's neighbors. Also, in our empirical
application we do not observe actual participation in community-based  efforts. Instead
we only observe the outcome from the individual's evaluation of (3)  as the response to a
quesLIon wnenULr  tn  nousvnoIu  would partclpate  m community basea service provision.
77  rT  and P.  are  tfk,iq f1,-  ."A  uindnt..  p  ic;  *  D  e  -+-
'-r,  '-'  _.  - I  --  "-  "&  "&yL44  ALILJIJ  CU11.A  U~&AL±AO  iA  IJLL1 FCaLU  II.jCLLiA&r,. LJ'...LCLOs are
discussed in the next section.
HIL Data
We test our model empirically using a household level socioeconomic  survey data
set for Bangalore, India (Deichmann,  Lall and Suri 2002). The focus of the survey is on
service provision and housing characteristics, but also includes a comprehensive
consumption module and general household information. 2905 households in the area
under the jurisdiction of the Bangalore City Corporation (i.e., the city proper rather than
the metro area) were selected using a random sampling scheme. The number of
households selected in each of 100 city wards is proportional to the number of
households  in the ward according to the 2001  census. To facilitate mapping and spatial
anLJY1L  UL OULY  vi  ofULLb,  UIV,  eU  piULoA;  ofULeLaUch Ul ehVd's  UrinVUh  b [UWIcc n  Veen
r.nnhtred iiuing olnbal nncitininin  svytpm  receive-rs
Bangolire is lucatedu in te  souuerm state oI Karnataka. Based on 2001  census
--. ,  -5g  - flo  is  LwJ  "I4  r.o  populou  c;JJjJ1ILI-.ty  ii.L.  `;"".  4.  &LLA -YJ  LionLL  pFeopLe-. IL  is
the center of the fifth largest urban agL7omeration  in the rountrv with 5.7 millinn
inhabitants. The city is best known as a global center for software research and services.
Its role as a regional economic engine is attracting a large number of migrants from all
over southern India, which together with continuing high fertility levels has led to apopulation grnwth rate of about 3% per year between  1991  and 2001.  while a share of
these migrants  are highly skilled computer workers, Bangalore continues to attract
migrant workers in all occupational  and income categories.  The city is thus characterized
by a mix of high, middle and low income housing. For instance, squatter settlements are
represented by 7.6 % of sample households.  The following paragraphs  describe the
variables used in our empirical analysis.  Table 1 provides a list of individual and
community variables used in this analysis and their definitions.  Summary statistics are
given in Table 2.
Willingness to participate
The Bangalore survey did not measure actual (i.e., revealed) community
participation. Instead, the survey asked the following question:
"Imagine that  your community could improve access to a service (such as
water  supply or garbage  collection) only through actions or contributions
by all members of  the community.  Would you participate  in such a
project?"
Pre-coded answers were given as "Yes,  definitely", "Yes, probably", "No,
probably not" and "No,  definitely not". The spatial distribution of the respondents who
answer 'Yes,  definitely' compared to other respondents is shown in Figure 1. Visual
inspection does not reveal any obvious clustering of responses.  Households who
answered in the affirmative were then asked whether they would contribute labor and/or
money for the initial investment and/or for operations  and maintenance.  Tne responses
cue s  .zed  i  Table 3. In this paper  've  are only concerned wi'S.  the ovrJll
participation decision.  Almost three auarters of the respondents state that they would
participate in community action,  and roughly 40% state that they would definitely
participate. These numbers are quite high and reflect the generally high level of civic
commitment found in southern India. A response that the household would participate in
community action, of course, does not mean that the household will indeed commit time
or other resources when a project is actually implemented.  This problem is familiar from
In IVcontinlgen1t  VCUa.U42LII  Ul  W1i1:-grs-tLU-p4y  bLUUIVb  (e.g,  VVl1ULLL;rgLUll  1770),  dllU  lb also)
not too different from  stated membprship  in a club or other social  group. Beinga mem.bpr
does not necessarily mean active participation  in the club's activities. To address this
problem, we focus on those households who answered that they will definitely participate,
since it is likely that these are households who would in fact engage in community
activities. Even so, in the results section we will briefly discuss results for the wider
definition of participation (both, households who answered probably and definitely yes).
Individual  characteristics
The decision to particinate  in community initiatives is conditioned on individual
and community characteristics. Among individual  characteristics we are most interested
in the household's tenure and income (expressed as expenditures per capita).  We
distinguish between owners  and non-owners. However,  Indian cities tend to have highly
regulated housing markets (Malpezzi and Tewari  1991). Stringent rent controls mean that
long term tenants have no incentive to change dwellings, if their rents have not increased
to market levels.  Owners cannot replace renters because regulation gives tenants wide-
rangmg protection from eviction. Furthermore, long term tenants often can perform
transactions on properties wiut  excnange of subsTantial key money. in such environments
,w  c.  expect  longi  te.... ten&nts. to act ;t no,  ver  y s; mil&ways ne n.rs.  Tnour commun
narticination  analvsis_ we therefore  expand oulr definition of tenure to include thnose
household who have own their home, as well as those who have lived in their dwelling
unit for at least twenty years.
To consider varying degrees of vulnerability to eviction even if the hoisehold har
tenure security (see Payne 2001), we control for various housing categories.  Ranked in
increasing order of tenure stability these are slums and squatter settlements, resettlement
colonies, unauthorized revenue sites, cooperative developments, and privately developed
formal settlements. While residents of squatter settlements have a fairly high chance of
being evicted,  legally constructed private housing has the safest tenure status. Almost half
of the households in Bangalore live on revenue sites. These are housing developments on
11lianU  LUiL  Was  Ub1UUoUL  *r.to  LLeI  U1a.LC-LeVL  WI.PLoJULt  foLIJl  app,o  j  bJL  y  V GU  aJ  uthoity
The leganlitv Of the cnonvermion  of pnrimarily agicultural land to non-agricultural use is
ambiguous.  While the revenue department can authorize land conversion with permission
of the planning authority, in practice authorization is often given without planning
reviews (Ravindra 1996).  We also test for significant differences  in the type of dwelling
units. We might expect that apartment dwellers have more interaction with their
neighbors and might therefore be more inclined to participate in community action than
residents of attached or free standing houses.
The household's  income is measured by its average annual per capita
consumption of food and non-food goods and services.  The survey includes a
comprehensive consumption module modeled on the Living Standards Measurement
Surveys  (Grosh and Giewwe 2000). For each household we construct a consumption
aggregate Iu0ol-wuig sta^ua-[  cL-11VU1U.-ions  19J97LULI  I  I,  Da.on4LUU  dUU  ZidiU  1  777).  he
rrpr capita  ;i  in our samrpl  ic  'A  735  npees P.nr  pei,nnrincy to
approximately 640 USD.3 Bangalore has a large middle class and a considerable number
of wealthy individuals engaged in the modem sector. But there continue to be large
variations in living standards across the city with a significant proportion of the
population having very low consumption. The spatial distribution of per capita
consumnption  by quartiles is shown in Figure 2. In contrast to many other cities around the
world, there is no obvious clustering of rich or poor areas. To test for the possibility of a
non-linear relationship between welfare status and participation, we include annual per
capita consumption  as well as a quadratic term in the empirical model. Figure 3 shows
the type of contmriution tmat nousenolds wouia oe wlling to maKe oy consumupuon
A-  A  -U  IA  -..  ---  -41  faa  co-da.,-  1.ak-,a  -n1.aI
L-U-nuiles. A.s  expectIed, poor,-,.  hLOUOsLI.ols  e  . 1.o  Y  willing  to  c..;IbULUfL.  lUUS.o,  whLilV
wenlthi.er households are more inclinpd to provi:de monetarv contributions.
WU (UUIIUI  iOJ  VIJLUW  UILUIVIUMU4  IIULLbIUlIUU  WILWU1LU  ab iUIiuWb.  ULIULUII
c.wapita!  trar.ab  are  lVikelt  to afffpe-t  the Apdisinn tn nanririnatpTt  WA  pynpi,t that hnhlQPh.onlA
3The standard deviation is quite high with 20,867 rupees. The median annual per capita consumption is
25,561  rupees.
12,,hgose  hn1Aeol  head is  mnore edwucted (fnvmad  sc~ahnn1nc'  )ne  anh  ldr  (e.yt.rpP  en.r  ! tps'it
knowledge) are more likely to anticipate benefits from participating. For female headed
households, the opportunity costs of participation might be very high as they have to take
care of children and household chores while being the main bread earner. Being a
member of a scheduled caste increases a household's vulnerability. As we discussed in
the description of our model, minorities or more vulnerable households may be more
likely to participate in self-help groups, since these households  can rely less on service
provision by the public sector. Whether this is indeed the case for scheduled castes in
India is somewhat debatable,  since these groups receive considerable affirmative action
1-~ be-nefiis-.
Community variables
We consider the impact of the following community level variables on the stated
willingness to participate in community action:  language fragmentation and the degree of
dominance of the main language as measures of social and cultural community
heterogeneity; average income (expenditure); and inequality as a measure of economic
heterogeneity.
A major question in estimating the effects of community level variables on the
probability of participating  in local collective action is how to define  a community.  In the
adsence  o01 prec-ise  IuinformaLion oinl  thae location o1fhouseholu resiences, most stuUies -use
fixed political  or ctatisircal units.  WFr instance  all householAd  reviAing  in the saev  blcArk
ward, city or district would be considered members of the community.  In a review of
about forty social science and economic studies that assess neighborhood  effects, almost
all use census tracts, counties or other administrative  units (Dietz 2000). Recent studies
on community participation in the U.S. have used the metropolitan statistical  areas
(MSA) as units of analysis (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000, Di Pasquale and Glaeser 2000).
La Ferrara's (2000) study on Tanzania defines communities as residents of the same
village. Given the large size of some of these units, the assumption that people living at
opposite ends of a unit interact or influence each other's decisions is sometimes rather
13LtInUUUs.  HIusUU  oldVIU  tIaL  iliiy  IIVVe  iU  LoUsV  pLUAxUiLLy  LU  vach1  UiLVL,  UUL  hp1pjeJnJ  LU  :Ve  Ull
Aiffe.rent sides of  aln  rtificial boundary, in contrast, are assumed to have no interction.
Administrative definitions of community are aDpropriate, however, where the research
question is related to the impact of policies.  Households living in the same unit may be
exposed to the same regulatory or administrative regime. For Bangalore,  it is ambiguous
whether neighborhood or administrative effects are more important. Households are more
likely to be influenced by other households near by, but local ward councilmen may also
have some influence over the level of services obtained within their jurisdiction.
We therefore use a specified number of closest neighbors for each household as
our definition of community, but also explore possible changes in the results when the
ward is used to define community.4 In the absence of comprehensive information on the
actual range of interaction, the decision how many neighbors define a community is
r  A  _---  __  . …  _  __.  __.  r_  . . -
Cnucal.  A smali number 01 neignours may wen relect acLuat iace-to-lace  interaction as
However,  many community based initiatives renuire wider narticination- which would
call for group formation across several city blocks. A small number of neighbors may
also introduce considerable random variation of community based indicators across
households. Given the relatively large sample size and good geographic coverage in our
survey, we chose 25 nearest neighbors as the definition of community. This number is
similar to the average number of sample households per ward. Results do not change
significantly when slightly fewer (20) or more (30) neighbors are used. In the remainder
of the paper we use the term community in general terms as a group of nearby residents
tiat inieract and potentially engage in aciivities towards a common goai. Communities
Aefined by +lk-rS.e  of-r.-aetfiw.oJaeelld,egbrooA  ;l  -a  -11A  .- e4 LL..LIIUAA  U.Y  U1I.1  IJLUJLU-I.L  MJ1  11%,a.L  L,  LJL%I.buLJLUJ1  L  O  CLL.  %..GLLIL%'u  I&  '1&C4  0FIU  /LLJ5V  .),  WLILLIV  VWUU  a  4  ~LV1I
to communities defined by the administrative divisions writhin the city.
4 We also considered a distance cut-off which treats all neighbors that reside within a specified
neighborhood as members  of the same community. However, the number of neighbors will vary
considerably among observations, which will reduce the stability of the resulting community variables.
14We use the household's mother tongue as the main indicator of social and cultural
homogeneity.  Soutn india is characterized  by a high degree of e-uno-iinguistic varationi.
Since  man-y  mgrants a4~  roe-  t+o+-  -s  Bar.ao  resideAnts  ir.clude a  r.go
ethnicities with different mother tongues- Tn  our sample; more than twelve different
languages are represented. 5 The distribution of the four largest language groups in our
sample is shown in Figure 4. Some degree of clustering is evident only for Urdu
speakers. Almost half of all sample residents speak Kannada,  the dominant language in
Karnataka. Kannada is used widely in local and state administration.  In fact, a recent
decree requires all official correspondence  in the state to be carried out in Kannada rather
than English or Hindi. Mother tongue also corresponds well with religion, an alternative
measure of potential group coherence, but provides more cultural disaggregation among
the sample housenolds.  About 78% ot tne sample households are Hinaus ana of tnese,
45%0 are  '%,iiillaud spers.  ,tiiu1  IV1Uslirll,  0770 air  UrdIUU  sjJVa&r,.  IVIVUIVM  LU11eLV
wn!es QiO^ifirnt1'U amnin  Chrtein.n  .uhn  connetit:t  ligee  thainr  5  0/f  the snmnlp. Othi.r
religions (Sikh and Jain) make up only 0.4% of sample households.
WeT  n  nr..ras  nnrnrn,,r.ity 
4
agrnnh',,n+n+on  usir.g  *1.e  approach,  ownl.,lo,ye  by  A loesna
TV  VI  IiiLG.L0UI% %  LAJIJ.JILUULy  II  G5CL1A%1VL4ILUL1%J11  U01LIr  LLL'.  aFFLJjJI 'JUL  %i1J1JIUJ  PL&L  U7E1.YLL
and La Ferrara (2000)  ais the probability that two randomly selected memhers of the
community belong to different language groups. The fragmentation index is calculated
as:
Language  firagmentationj =1  -T  's  (4)
k
wherej represents a given community, k is the language, and s is the share of households
in the community speaking language k. As discussed above, we believe that in a very
heterogeneous  environment such as Bangalore, there may be differences between
community participation by rmembers of the dominant ethno-iinguistic group (Kannada
speakers),  adIU  IIiUILiJbeVr  o1  rlHUtILY  giOupS Who  H14ay have mIigrLatUed  Lo  Uhe  cILy relaLIVely
5AM_  Theshe  AM  Y  (0  p.e:.cn  14ft]. ..- Ip. pops lU  TTrA-  .8), T  (15.f  4  r.-  *),  e  A  legu f.),  Q
Malayalam (2.3), Hindi (2.3), Maratbi (2.1),  Kornkani (0.8), Tulu (0.4), Corgi (0.1), English (0.1), Others
15recently.  Native speaKers may feel better represenied by their elected and non-elected
_=_ta.l  .-  A.ay  - n.ar for  ex_va  pec"tp^  the  WJflt  rp7  Y.e  Vt  1.  oAcrn11.LU.J  0fY  VPr%7;1
Members of minority groups; in contrast; rmay face barriers to interaction with nublic
institutions  and perceive a greater need for self reliance.  This is similar to the situation in
the U.S. where, according to Alesina and La Ferrara (2000), African Americans are
"more conscious of being a minority and have extra incentive to engage in political
action to preserve their identity andfoster  their  political  and civil rights." (p. 864). In
addition to general language fragmentation,  we therefore also test whether participation is
affected by the degree of dominance  of the most important language in the community,
and whether there are differences between speakers of the-dominant language  and
speakers of minority languages.  Fimally, we consluer the eiiect oI economic mequality on
the participation decisio.. us;r.  a loa,  l  C-ii  t  wi  c  l  f  over l,l
nei  ,hhnrhnnd incOme lPevek  The local rTini for nei  'hhorhoodq  Ind wqrdq is cornmited
respectively by using per capita consumption of the household's closest neighbors or of
all other households  within the same ward.
IV. Findings
We now present the empirical results of our analysis and discuss the sensitivity of
these results to the choice of the dependent variable and the definition of the local
community. Table 4 presents the results for those households who answered that they
would definitely participate.  Columns (1)  and (2) show estimates for communities defined
as the household's nearest neighbors,  while columns (3) and (4) present ward level
results. Table 5 presents the results where participating households include those that
answered that they would proDaDly participate.
Does tenure security enhance community participation?  We find that security of
tenure as measured by ownership  (or very long tenure) has a positive and significant
effect on tie probability of participation. The  ULarglal effect of tenure security in
col-nrs (1)  arnd (2) is A 125 - having se_ure tenri e increases th.e probability of
16nartininfinAln  hv 12  .5  nprrpnt  The coefficient is sionnifiant nnd Ot.le across model
specifications-choice  of community variables and definition of participation.  Beyond
ownership, we find that housing categories that are characterized by more secure tenure
arrangements-government  provided plots/flats, cooperative/employer  housing, and
unauthorized revenue sites-encourage  the willingness to participate in community
efforts. This implies that strengthening property rights and formalizing existing tenure
regimes will have a significant impact upon a community's  stability and its ability to
organize to achieve a common goal. This is turn calls for more systematic institutional
analysis of different tenure regimes to better inform policymakers on how they can phase
in  morseure  ~cten-uieLi  [igliWt.
In addition to tenure security, we find that households living on revenue sites and
cooperative housing developments  are more likely to participate than other nousehoids
(+i.  co.rntrol  grrn.nioup  ,  being  households  in,  s,l,1.  m~  &nd  .afate  setlements).  o,.u4.e  coef  nfici,ner.t
Y.LLL  ~4L1U~I  61  &WUP.  UVeLi5r  JLiJU&O%.IiLPJ.OJ%A  iI  OJLU111  aiiL%i  O%JuaL&CM,.1  O  L~k.  I  PO  . iii  CI.'L1IJAIJ.I%iS
for both these cateponries are positive and significant. For example,  using neighborhoods
as the definition of community (column (1)),  the estimate for revenue  sites (category 3)  is
0.122.  This means that that the probability of participation of these households  is 12
percent higher than for households living in slum and squatter settlements. The
coefficients  for both these housing categories (revenue sites and cooperative housing
developments)  remain positive and significant when we replace neighborhoods by wards,
and also when we use a broader definition of willingness to participate.
Does welfare status matter? We find the probability of participation increases at a
decreasing rate with per capita consumption. The coefficients for consumption  and
consumption squared are individually as well as jointly significant.  In column (1), using
the neighborhood  level community variables, we estimate that the effects of added per
capita consuIiptLion on UL[n  probability 01 participation peaks at Rs.  i i,500, ana urops to
zero  at Rs. 23,000.  TAhis coresponds to the  45th percentile of  th.e consuption distibution
in Bangalore.  These results hold for ward level communities.  The results however are not
17jointly significant when we change the dependent variable from 'definitely yes' to
'definitely and probably yes'.
In addition to own income levels, we test if community income levels have an
effect on the probability of participation.  The community level income variable for each
household is the average per capita consumption of all other households  in the
COmmUnIty.  LUUm11uI1y  InlcmC IS not sIgxncanl  using Me Lo cIosesI nelgnWors,  DUt 1S
si=rnn..fi  ozn 5 using  v  0d  Las  fh,e  cormLAAfltyd.~fl±ni.jn.  Us.g±1  ward  le  1v  el  test;....ates  (co!  . fl
(3)  we find that particination neaks at Rs. 31  000, and dronp  to zero at Rs  62,000-
Participation thus appears to be highest for middle class households and among
households in middle class communities. This is reflected in the estimates for individual
and community income effects. In another specification not reported in these tables, we
tested the middle class hypothesis by replacing own consumption and consumption
squared by a dummy variable, which takes the value one, if  the household belongs to the
middle. two per capita consumption quartiles. The coefficient for the middle class is
positive and significant suggesting that middle class households are indeed more likely to
participate.
Besides the impact of tenure security, our second main hypothesis concerns the
effects of community heterogeneity in endowments and in culture. We find that
heterogeneity in endowments me-nasured by the Gini coefncient oI community  ievei per
nnntnnnunnnnnntnth 7 n,nEntnlnlnto.  I  nnf  nnna'TI.  -P
aplta,  consuMpfionA  does  not  have  ar.y  effect  on  Villir.ess  to  -I  iCipate.  X IIe  coeffeicitenteLI
ie nnt .tqtiqtir.a1Iv  qionifinant iwinor either clefinitinn of  rmmmimitv  (rlneePt neicrhhnrc  wndl
wards) and the two dependent variables. We use two specifications to test for the effects
of cultural heterogeneity.  In the first version using neighborhood variables (column (1))
we use the share of the dominant language and whether the household belongs to the
dominant language group. The F-test for joint significance shows that both of these
variables are jointly significant at 5%. The marginal effect for the share of the dominant
language is -0.103 but is not individually significant. This implies that willingness to
participation may be higher in more diverse neighborhoods.  The coeffficient for the
18V  ~L"WL~  &UJ  p  IJUL  LA'J1  LU.V'  VV LLVU1JLL1.  '  LU  ULO  %11U1JU  U%I.4Ura5  LV  UJLV  UVU1IiU1aLIL  iLaiiJLU4rV IS  'J.VJU
which means that the household's willinrness to participate decreases  hv 3.6 % if it
belongs to the dominant language group. In the second specification (columns  (2) and
(4)), we replace the share of the dominant language in the neighborhood by the
fragmentation index described in equation (4). The fragmentation index and the dummy
variable of whether the household belongs to the dominant language are jointly
significant at the 5% level. The fragmentation index is statistically significant
individually and positive, which implies that willingness to participate increases with
language  fragmentation.  However, the fragmentation  index becomes  insignificant when
we useb  thn  warus as communuty boundanres.  usmg  "me 'aefnmiteiy  and prooably yes
categoryI% for  %.  dv  r.e  va-,ahl  m.1  -es  .ot  Ofthese r-esults~  sta44.-;sia1yi.siriicr ~~  J  *~~*  ~Cs'  V  ~1"l  w  1  JLJL%JA1~..'vO  AL%JOI.  ML  LE1I%,  I  L  OL"IOLI%I9IJ.aIY  HIDIrLI  %UUL.LL.
These findings sunnort our hvnothesis that the added cost ofheternoeneitv doesnot
decrease the willingness to participate, when participation  is intended to achieve a
common objective. In some cases we even find that participation is higher in fragmented
communities.
The hypothesis that member of the majority are favored by public largesse,  and
the minorities must fend for themselves, receives additional support from the parameter
estimate on the indicator for scheduled caste.  Members of this traditionally
disadvantaged group are far more willing to engage in collective action than other groups.
In fact, the effect of membership  in this group  (11 percent increase in probability) is
close to the effect of home ownership (13 percent increase), although both parameters are
estimatea with sufficient precision that we can safely reject their equality.
Finally, we discuss the effects of three additional household characteristics which
are included as controls - age of the household head, education of  household head, and
W1uCUiit[  LuV  houseoldUU  is itrn1au neaueu.  Educauon nas oeen cirea as an exampie ot
"br;cridging" scia.I capita! - that is,  a  .fa^f  c  uk.t a  to overcor.eU  U-he  --  c  UnsiullCLU  UI
by traditionally narrowly "binding" forns of social canital  such as race and ethnicity--
we also find that education of  the household head has significant effects on the
i9willingness to participate. Using the neighborhood definition of community, we find that
having high school education increases probabliity of participation by nearly 6%. This
nnoeffn.anf  .a  tohln  i  rmA  r.dcorsstr.tacrs  mvAodl  cication_.  Thus, nrn.rorn  of
education; besides having well documented human capital  rethinia  generates  a positive
externality since it also helps to increase social participation, which in turn facilitates the
provision of complementary public services. In contrast, we do not find any effects of age
of the household head on willingness to participate. Female headed households are about
8% less willing to participate. One possible explanation of the reduced probability of
participation of female-headed households is the added opportunity cost of participation
in the presence of additional responsibilities.
Our study also highlights an important analytical issue of direct relevance to
public service delivery. Most empirical studies which examine the relationship between
community participation  and public service delivery, take the community as a given
administrative/census  defined unit. Our study demonstrates that the definition of
COMMuLity matters in what one evenLtually says is iupoLtant  il affIeing parlicipation.
we firnd thnat nrtirtidntiAn innrpee  Wuith wvlfarpw  atntini.  the  Wxward (Qm.Tna+v;M
definition) specification.  but not in the neighborhood (spatially constructed)  specification.
A priori, it is rarely entirely clear whether a census defined ward is better or worse than a
geographically  defined nearest neighbor criterion. This highlights the need for sensitivity
analysis and suggests that rather than taking a census defined community or
manufacturing  a statistical community, there is often a need for more detailed
identification of social interactions pertaining to service delivery.
V  Cannlulivifns
In this paper we examine factors influencing a household's willingness to
participate in community based service provision programs. Using data from a recently
completed geo-referenced househoid  survey for Bangaiore,  India, we test two important
iLiL 01othses on -why  ho1us  ldn  ill ce.five  acfio.  ILe fLst I1ypoLhesis  is 'uia
20tern.ue secLuitiy  exhances  +1,0  ,ailUiLy  of  FCaLLtfc;.*'.;.n rnainly,  beo1Ucas  "h.e  rAVOc,Ltna
apprec.iation  in housing values can be capitalized and the anticinated benefit stream from
service provision is accrued over a longer period. We find that security of tenure has a
significant and positive impact on the willingness to participate in collective  action for
access to urban services. Tenure security is an important policy issue in most developing
country cities. Moving  from highly insecure to de facto tenure has significant private
benefits which include reduced risk of eviction, increased house values, ability to use the
home as collateral, and associated rights to urban services (Payne 2001, Kessides 2002).
Thus while longer residence seems to confer some defacto (exchangeable) ownership
rignts, the structure of tenure also matters. As tenure security is a function of individuai
,WIiL;.-  fAUacL  orI  AL  JuL  )  n  asweaspoLeLdIU  Vno  UIIP.;  1 QUIS4LA  I  LyLJL,  U¢"I'.I  %...  AUiIUIIU%-I
to threat of eviction,  coI1enitivim  is also likely to 'hond'  the neighborhood  and enable the
community to negotiate the group's claims with the local government (Jimenez  1985).
This highlights (a) the importance of increasing access to formal credit markets to enable
more households, including the poorest, to enter the housing market, and (b) reducing
distortions in the land and housing markets so that  property rights can be allocated in
more efficient and equitable ways.
Our second main hypothesis is that heterogeneity in endowments or culture does
not reduce the willingness of residents to participate in activities that are expected to
yield economic benefits or improvements in living standards. This question is of special
concem to a development community in search of innovative approaches to address the
lack of access to basic services in developing country cities. Drawing on the existing
vUU1IFL  WULY  kiLLILcIUULI  IlUl14LLU1,  WMIL;I  lbi Ilyrgy lIUllU  LU  Ult  44U;SL1UH 01
partlIcpation  in social clubs or  religious grou ps, may lead to the con.clusion that
communitv efforts in heterogeneous  communities will have little chance of succeeding.
In our study in Bangalore, however, we find that cultural, social or economic
heterogeneity does not decrease the willingness to participate in community efforts. In
fact, neighborhoods that are more diverse appear to have higher levels of expected
participation.  It may be that minority groups have less representation in the local
21government, and less access to publicly provided services.  Our findings suggest that
CUU1UU1UuiJILL"  WVALUU  lb PUbb1U1t  VVV11  1LI LUV  1lULVlUrVL11WUUb  WLAJ11ULLUb1LV  U14L  UILAV1L~LUZ
raidly ,rn;ur ng nirhbin areas, pnro:ldipe  that thep goal  of n2rt.i  nicnT  ic to achiPvp a
common obiective vielding individual benefits.
In aAA,4ion  to  the  pfrect0 of Gon.ire sec..,ty  .-A  A-atarno  +xA,  we fnd *1.at
AAA 4A%A&LEAWI&*  LW  SJ  %LZAIL.O  WA± L%VIUSA.t  OVtdUALUt  UMt*Lt  J
6 'Uf
3 AV  W&t  1J
participation is most prevalent in middle class households  and communities- This
supports our discussion that the perceived benefits of participation do not offset the cost
of interaction for the rich who can either privately obtain the service or may already have
access to most basic services. In contrast, the transaction cost of participation (especially
in heterogeneous  settings) is high for the poor due to limited levels of community trust, as
reflected in our focus group interviews.
There is general consensus that community action in the provision of urban
services is a viable option when the public sector is unable and the private sector
unwilling to invest. However, actual evidence on the success of such efforts is relatively
scarce, and we do not know enough about the factors that determine success or failure.
Also, as the urban population in developing countries is predicted to double over the next
30 years-,  all Uputu,s for ranulir  4access  LU  UbaILc  bsIeVILceb  nd  Lo Ue con  sidu-MUd.  JuL
ir,mponrtanft question then is whether commnit.y based se.rvice proision i  scalable. To
make a significant difference,  there is a need to expand such nro2rams to a verv large
number of urban communities. How to facilitate successful community initiatives and
how to transfer successful implementations quickly and widely are important questions
for researchers and policy makers alike.
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Participation  1  Household responded that it would definitely participate  in community
initiatives to improve urban services
Particination 2  Household resnonded that it would definitely or nrnbably  participate in
community initiatives to improve urban services
Individual
Tenure sft.tus  H  hOse  ,nold  o,,.  d  eW1iVTg  ,  ,-t  o.r 1T,  hived ;n sune  fo  20 ye  or
Housing category  1 = squatter settlement, non-notified  or notified (base case)
4-  XW  MLUvUb  dUve
3= Unauthorized revenue  site or Vatarra
4= Government provided plots or flats, Cooperative or employer housing
5 = Private builders or City Improvement Trust Board
Type of house  1 = free standing house
2 = attached house
3 = flat / apartment (base case)
Welfare status  Annual per capita household consumption (Rupees)
Education  Household head has at least a high school degree
Age  Experience -Age of household head
Female HHH  Female headed household
Scheduled caste  Household is a member of a "scheduled caste, tribe or other backward claSvi
Language  Household's mother tongue is the dominant language group in community
Community
Fr1
51ft,lItflSa  *  ProbYba.i.  LuJUt  .VT T  husehot,ldsl  in  the,  t,tnn&*z..t  have  Vt,  same  OGLI,  *UILU
tongue
-,dLlguageu  dor1u  uc  a  S  t--e  LUC  UUhedU1Lnu language among nouscnolus m the community
Inequality  Gini of household annual per capita consumption in the conmmunity
Welfare  level  Average annual per capita household consumption of neighbors in the
community (Rupees)
Group homes initially built for industrial  workers
29Table 2: Variable means and standard deviations
Mean  Std. deviation
Dependent variables
Households definitely willing  .746  .435
to participate
Households definitely or  .391  .488
probably willing to participate
Individual variables
T.  enure status (Secure tenure)  ArR2Q  0.4R3
Housing  category 1  0.076  0.264
flUUSiII  L~LCaU----  1  0.0%  13  A. 4 413
Housing category 3  0.578  0.494
Housing category 4  0.164  0.370
Housing category 5  0.169  0.375
House type 1  .365  .481
House type 2  .600  .489
House type 3  .035  .183
WAef.rA  rtatuis  (in 10nOls)  3.068  2.086
- squared (in 10,000s)  13.797  31.979
Eduuailon  .A  r4
Age  47.35  12.34
Female headed household  .075  .263
Scheduled caste  .128  .335
Community defined as nearest  Community defined by ward
neighbors  boundaries
Mean  Std. deviation  Mean  Std.  deviation
Fragmentation  0.609  0.139  0.617  0.129
Lang.1age rinminance  0.n32  0.156  0.531  0.144
Community welfare level  3.034  0.837  3.068  0.901
-squared  9.911  5.732  10.226  6.949
Inequality  0.265  0.058  0.269  0.063
TableU  3:  v.ruuuea  io  pas uczpuab  ard  iype of  cou.botlor.  (perer..
,wo,  old you  PBrc.P,nt  Tun,- nf  T,ibhial  (ra2hinine  &r
participate?  contribution  investment  Maintenance
Definitely yes  39.1  Money  77.8  48.5
Probably yes  35.5  Labor  49.1  67.4
Probably no  16.4
Definitely no  9.1
30Table 4: Estimation results for households definitely intending to participate
Community defined as nearest  Community defined by ward
neighbors  boundaries
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Individual variables
Tenure status  0.125  0.125  0.123  0.123
(0.019)**  (0.019)*  (0.019)**  (0.019)**
Housing category 2  -0.063  -0.065  -0.072  -0 073
(0.088)  (0.088)  (0.087)  (0.087)
Housingcategory3  0.122  0.122  0.115  0.114
(0.038)**  (0.038)*  (0.038)*  (0.038)**
Housina cateaorv4  0.22  0 219  0.213  0.214
(0.045)**  (0.046)*  (0.046)*  (0.046)*
Hnining categonry 5  0.108  0.107  0.103  0.102
(0.045)*  (0.045)*  (0.045)*  (0.045)*
HnI ieptvnA  1  nn011  n0n12  n.nn0  n.nn
(0.054)  (0.054)  (0.054)  (0.054)
House tyne 2  0.022  0.023  0.019  n.n2
(0.053)  (0.053)  (0.053)  (0.053)
Welfare status  0.023  0.023  0.028  0.028
(0.010)*  (0.010)*  (0.010)**  (0.010)**
snsuared  -0.0011  -0.001  .V0V01  =n0n
(0.001)*  (0.001)*  (0.001)*  (0.001)*
EduCation  0.057  0.056  0.053  0.053
(0.023)*  (0.023)*  (0.023)*  (0.023)*
An,=  flArg  nnnna  A Age  0.05  0  05  0 05%0.Il
(0.031)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.031)
Fenma!e headed household  n.naa  -0.n08  -n.nn2  n  nn-
(0.034)*  (0.034)*  (0.034)**  (0.034)**
nd44ule  +  0  04112  0.14A  4.11
(0.029)**  (0.029)*  (0.029)**  (0.029)**
Lnguage  -n.n036  -10.033  ^-0.010.1
(0.019)+  (0.020)+  (0.019)  (0.019)
ComMoU..^vrfb
Fragmentation  0.123  0.114
(0.075)+  (0.080)
Language dominance  -0.103  -0.136
In  A&&  IA  A-%A
Community welfare level  0.095  0.094  0.142  0.135
(0.069F)  (0.0o6)  (0.02)*  (.062)*
- squared  -0.016  -0.016  -0.023  -0.022
[v)  I0)+  (0.010)  (0.007)**  (0.007)**
Inequality  0.261  0.263  0.171  0.212
(V.1  76)  (0.175)  (0.172)  (0.i69)
Observations  2901  2901  2901  2901
F-tests for joint significance
Welfare status & -squared  (5.08)+  (5.04)+  (7.18)*  (7.36)*
Welfare level & -squared  (4.45)  (4.66)+  (18.55)**  (18.84)**
Fragmentation  & language  (8.21)*  (8.43)*  (5.021+  (3.54)Table 5: Estimation results for households  definitely or probably intending to participate
Community defined as nearest  Community defined by ward
neighbors  boundaries
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Individual variables
Tenure status  0.12  0.12  0.119  0.119
(0.018)**  (0.018)**  (0.018)**  (0.018)-
Housing category 2  -0.142  -0.143  -0.138  -0.139
(0.086)+  (0.087)+  (0.086)  (0.086)
Housing category 3  0.073  0.073  0.077  0.076
(0.033)*  (0.033)*  (0.033)*  (0.033)*
Housing category 4  0.13  0.13  0.132  0.132
(0.029)**  (0.029)**  (0.029)*  (0.029)-
Housing category 5  0.044  0.044  0.05  0.049
(0.034)  (0.034)  (0.033)  (0.033)
Housing type 1  0.087  0.088  0.09  0.089
(0.044)*  (0.044)*  (0.044)*  (0.044)*
Housing type 2  0.029  0.03  0.032  0.033
(0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047)
Welfare status  -0.016  -0.016  -0.016  -0.016
(0.010)+  (0.010)+  (0.010)  (0.010)
- squared  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001
(0.001)  (0.001)+  (0.001)  (0.001)
Education  0.044  0.044  0.041  0.041
(0.021)*  (0.021)*  (0.021)+  (0.021)+
Age  0.003  0.003  -0.001  -0.001
(0.029)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.029)
Female headed household  -0.01  -0.01  -0.013  -0.013
(0.032)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.032)
Scheduled caste  0.08  0.08  0.079  0.079
(0.022)**  (0.022)**  (0.022)**  (0.022)**
Language  -0.021  -0.021  -0.014  -0.017
(0-017)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0-017)
Community level variables
Fragmentation  0069  0 109
(0.065)  (0.069)
Languae dominne  -0.082  -01
(0.057)  (0.064)*
f'^mm  Iniftu .AIIIfare  level  0.003  0.003  0.06  0.053
(0.060)  (0.060)  (0.043)  (0.043)
-squared  -0.004  -0.004  -0.01  -0.01
(0.009)  (0.009)  (0.005)+  (0.005)+
lnequaliby  n.n103  -0.009  0.033
(0.157)  (0.156)  (0.152)  (0.149)
Observations  2901  2901  2901  2901
F-tests for joint significance
Welfare status & -squared  (2.89)  (2.94)  (2.71)  (2.55)
Welfare level & -squared  (3.69)  (4.14)  (7.84)*  (8.26)*
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